Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

Using a new expert survey, the authors explore the democraticness of traditional political systems (TPS) in 159 ethnic groups in Africa. Their initial analysis finds that measures of public preference input and political process control are particularly strong contributors to the degree that a society may develop democracy in their TPS. They also find that societies with powerful elders are more likely to be democratic, while more hierarchically organized political systems and those with kings, chiefs, and segmentary lineages are less likely.

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.

In this paper, the authors argue that polygyny creates social inequality in which economically advantaged men marry multiple women and economically disadvantaged men marry late in life or potentially never. The institution of polygyny results in a higher proportion of single men without families ("excess men"), who, the authors propose, may turn to violence to achieve higher wealth or prestige. Following this theory, the authors hypothesize that societies with more polygynous neighbors will be at higher risk for intergroup conflict, for which they find robust support. They also find that young men in polygynous societies, who are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and have less prestige, are also more likely to feel as though they are treated unequally and more ready to resort to violence, supporting the authors' theorized underlying mechanism.